My client – (whom I shall identify by the pseudonym of ‘David’) – was what, in colloquial terms, is known as a ‘grass’ i.e a criminal who provided information to the Police about other criminals, in this case information about Organised Crime Group (OCG) nominals i.e. gang members, involved in class A drug supply in the region.
The Police subsequently attended at an address linked to the gang in order to execute a search warrant. During the search, Officers had with them a file containing a ‘subject profile’ which contained sensitive information provided by David.
Unfortunately, upon leaving the address the Officers realised that the ‘subject profile’ document was no longer in the file and had, in fact, been left behind at the premises. Whereas the object of Police searches is to locate evidence of crime, here the Officers had instead given the criminals evidence which potentially compromised David’s safety as an informant.
The Police reported the loss of the subject profile to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).
The Constabulary’s Head of Information Rights and Disclosure and the ICO determined that David had to be notified about what had occurred, as he now faced what in bureaucratic jargon is delicately described as a “high likelihood of detrimental impact”.
At that time, David was a prisoner serving a sentence, but was soon to be released. As prison walls are often no barrier to the reach of organised crime gangs, it was recognised that there could well be implications for David’s safety within the prison. In the circumstances, prison security staff were briefed via police liaison officers and David was notified of the data breach.
Following notification, David contacted his family, to warn them of the data breach and the significant risk arising both to himself and them.
Shortly afterwards, David was released from prison, but, shockingly, was placed in temporary accommodation which was not very far from the area where the Organised Crime Group were based. David felt very vulnerable staying in the area, and feared that the gang would locate and seriously injure, if not kill, him. Indeed, David felt so desperate at this time that he actually considered committing an offence and then immediately handing himself in so that he would be sent back to prison again.
In light of the data breach, David was of the view that he should be placed in the witness protection system, but he was told by the Police that this was not an option. The Police were showing a very lackadaisical concern for David’s plight, notwithstanding that it was their gross error which had put him in this situation.
On his release from prison David had initially been told that the Police would assist with his short and long term housing requirement but it now became clear that this was not the case. Feeling abandoned by the Police, David began self-harming and his family had to intervene to arrange medical treatment.
With no permanent accommodation being made available for him, David was housed in cheap hotels for several nights, during which time he became increasingly paranoid that he was being followed.
Indeed, his mental health condition deteriorated to such an extent that he was detained by the Police under the Mental Health Act and ‘sectioned’ in mental health hospitals for a period of time.
It was only following his discharge from mental health care that David was finally able to secure relocation to permanent accommodation in an entirely different area of the country.
Nevertheless, he naturally continued to be fearful of reprisals and remained hypervigilant and wary.
I pursued a claim for compensation on David’s behalf against the Police, seeking damages for negligence, breach of the Data Protection Act and breach of the Human Rights Act.
The law in this area was well-defined by the 2012 case of An Informer v A Chief Constable in which it was established that the Police owe informants such as David a duty of care to take reasonable steps to protect them from physical harm, as well as a duty of confidence. It was admitted by the Police that the circumstances of the loss of the subject profile did amount to a breach of those duties, although they put David to proof as to the nature and extent of his loss.
As was stated by Lord Justice Toulson in the Informer case (paragraph 62 of the judgment) –
“The relationship between the police and a CHIS [“Covert Human Intelligence Source”] is a confidential relationship. The confidentiality serves two main purposes. The first is the safety andpeace of mind of the CHIS. Acting as a CHIS may be risky and stressful. If the person’s identity became known, he or his family might in some cases be exposed to serious injury or death and in less extreme cases to other disturbing forms of harassment. The second purpose is the encouragement of the supply of information to the police by people who are unlikely to come forward unless they can be confident that their confidentiality will be protected.”
After negotiations, the Police agreed to pay David a significant amount of money, plus legal costs.
